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Abstract
Background: The article develops an eight-period game between N persons and a pharmaceutical company. The
choices of a donor and Nature are parametric.
Methods: Persons choose between safe and risky behavior, and whether or not to buy drugs. The pharmaceutical
company chooses whether or not to develop drugs. The donor chooses parametrically whether to subsidize drug
purchases and drug developments. Nature chooses disease contraction, recovery, death, and virus mutation. The
game is solved with backward induction.
Results: The conditions are specified for each of seven outcomes ranging from safe behavior to risky behavior and
buying no or one or both drugs. The seven outcomes distribute themselves across three outcomes for the
pharmaceutical company, which are to develop no drugs, develop one drug, and develop two drugs if the virus
mutates. For these three outcomes the donor’s expected utility is specified.
Conclusion: HIV/AIDS data is used to present a procedure for parameter estimation. The players’ strategic choices
are exemplified. The article shows how strategic interaction between persons and a pharmaceutical company, with
parametric choices of a donor and Nature, impact whether persons choose risky or safe behavior, whether a
pharmaceutical company develops no drugs or one drug, or two drugs if a virus mutates, and the impact of
subsidies by a donor.
Keywords: Pharmaceutical industry, Health, Patients, Donors, Safe versus risky behavior, Disease contraction,
Recovery, Death, Drug development, Virus mutation, Subsidies, Game theory
Background
Contribution
This article assesses the strategic choices of persons
to engage in risky behavior and whether or not to
buy drugs, a pharmaceutical company choosing
whether to develop expensive drugs to combat dis-
ease, and a donor choosing parametrically whether to
fund drug development and drug purchases for poor
people in the face of declining aid flows and growing
patient incomes.
An eight-period game is developed. A disease such as
a HIV/AIDS or Covid-19 virus attacks a person or not,
given that the person chooses risky behavior. The
pharmaceutical company responds by developing or not
developing drug 1 which the person buys or not and the
donor subsidizes to a certain degree, or does not
subsidize. The person responds positively and the virus
is contained or it mutates. If it mutates, a drug 2 is or is
not developed. Upon consuming or not consuming drug
2, the person recovers or dies.
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The person’s expected utility is life. The pharmaceut-
ical company’s expected profit follows from drugs being
bought. The pharmaceutical company benefits if the per-
son buys and consumes drug 1 or indeed drug 2 per-
petually, like anti-retrovirus, or one off when the person
recovers completely. The pharmaceutical company in-
curs costs of investing in drug research and develop-
ment. The person pays for the drug or it is donor-
funded through aid flows. Infected persons may suffer
consequences such as losing their jobs or otherwise ex-
perience decreased life quality. The potential patient can
also invest in acquiring knowledge on how not to con-
tract the disease.
The article’s objectives and research questions are to
determine the players’ optimal strategies, and how these
strategies and the model parameters impact which of the
seven outcomes emerges. The methods in the article are
to solve the game with backward induction starting with
period 8. In period 8 Nature chooses recovery versus
death probabilistically. In period 7 a person buys drug 2,
sponsored by a donor, if the benefits outweigh the costs.
In period 6 the pharmaceutical company develops drug
2 sponsored by a donor, if the benefits outweigh the
costs. In period 5 the virus mutates or does not mutate.
In period 4 a person buys drug 1, sponsored by a donor,
if the benefits outweigh the costs. In period 3 the
pharmaceutical company develops drug 1 sponsored by
a donor, if the benefits outweigh the costs. In period 2
Nature chooses disease contraction probabilistically. In
period 1 the person chooses risky or safe behavior.
The model brings together persons which may con-
tract a disease and purchase drugs, a pharmaceutical
company which may or may not develop drugs, a donor
which may or may not subsidize, a virus which may or
may not mutate, and Nature which impacts disease con-
traction, recovery, and death.
The model’s assumptions are to consider diseases ful-
filling three requirements. First, we assume that whether
a person contracts the disease depends on whether the
person chooses risky or safe behavior, e.g. using a con-
dom against HIV or wearing a mask or keeping distance
against Covid-19. Hence diseases are excluded which do
not depend on the person’s behavior, which are genetic
or hereditary, which are caused by the environment, or
which depend on economic and political factors and so-
cietal trends outside the person’s control. Second, we as-
sume that one or two drugs can be developed to
potentially cure a disease. If one or two drugs cannot be
developed, the model reduces to the special case where
the one or two drugs are not available. Third, we assume
that disease recovery is possible to some extent with or
without one or two drugs. We allow for great variation
in the degree of recovery, from complete recovery, via
some recovery, no recovery, and death.
The model’s assumptions abstracts away healthcare
workers, hospitals, governments, international organiza-
tions, and various other players in our health and polit-
ical/economical systems. These other players are crucial,
e.g. as advisors, facilitators, and providers of knowledge
and services. By abstracting away these other players and
factors, we are able to focus explicitly on the strategic
interaction between the N persons, the pharmaceutical
company, the donor (which is parametric in the ana-
lysis), and Nature.
The model helps understand individual behavior re-
garding contracting disease and the purchasing of drugs
when interacting with a pharmaceutical company which
may or may not develop drugs, a donor which may or
may not subsidize, and Nature which may precariously
determine disease contraction, recovery, death, and virus
mutation. The model is integrated in the sense that it
brings the relevant players together in the decision mak-
ing process.
Empirical data is provided of HIV/AIDS data for
prevalence, deaths, HIV expenditure, treatment costs,
R&D costs and revenues, and HIV resource availability
are presented. In 2019, 38 million people lived with
HIV/AIDS.1 Using the data, a procedure is presented for
estimating the model parameters. An example shows
how the players’ strategic decisions may cause various
outcomes.
The literature
Game theoretic analysis of interaction between persons
and a pharmaceutical company is uncommon. Four
game theoretic studies have been identified. Hausken
and Ncube [18, 19] analyze interactions between policy
makers choosing resource allocation between prevention
and treatment of disease, the international community
choosing funding to treat disease, and Nature choosing
which proportion of the population contracts disease,
and which fractions remains sick or does, versus re-
covers. Mamani, Chick, and Simchi-Levi [29] develop a
game theoretic model of international influenza vaccin-
ation coordination. Hausken and Ncube [20] consider a
game between a drug company and patients which con-
template whether to purchase a drug.
Aside from these four studies, the literature is more
tangential to this article. A literature does exist on
disease treatment and prevention. Below we review
this literature, and attempt to explain or justify their
interest for this article, which is implicitly focused on
disease treatment and prevention. The literature fo-
cuses strongly on treatment rather than prevention, in
contrast to this article which focuses on how drugs
1https://www.amfar.org/about-hiv-and-aids/facts-and-stats/statistics%2
D%2Dworldwide/, retrieved February 20, 2021.
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may or may not be developed and funded as a conse-
quence of a disease being contracted or not
contracted. For example, Thomas [35], Kremer and
Glennerster [25], and Kremer and Snyder [26, 27]
suggest that incentives for drug development for
treatment outweigh incentives for vaccine develop-
ment for prevention. Potentially, with such a focus
more citizens may become sick, causing more re-
sources to treatment than prevention.
With the strong focus on treatment in the literature,
Hecht et al. [21] and Izazola-Licea et al. [24] assess the
financing of the response to HIV/AIDS in low-income
and middle-income countries. West and Schneider [38]
estimate revenues for HIV/AIDS treatment for the years
2017–2021 for various African countries. Forsythe et al.
[13] assess the global costs, health achievements, and
economic benefits of 20 years of ART (antiretroviral
therapy) for people living with HIV. DiMasi et al. [11]
stipulate $2.6 billion for HIV drug R&D costs for the
years 2017–2021. Coates, Richter, and Caceres [8] evalu-
ate behavioral strategies to reduce HIV transmission.
Moxnes and Hausken [31] model acute virus influenza
A infections.
For research on treatment versus prevention see
Boily et al. [5], Bertozzi et al. [4], Canning [6], Alistar
and Brandeau [1], Bärnighausen, Salomon, and
Sangrujee [3], Gonsalves [16], Kumaranayake, Watts,
Dixon, Mc Donald, and Roberts [28], and Paltiel and
Stinnett [32], and the HIV Modelling Consortium
Treatment as Prevention Editorial Writing Group
[22]. Regarding the cost effectiveness of treatment
and prevention, see Creese, Floyd, Alban, and Guinness
[10], Granich et al. [17], Galárraga, Colchero, Wamai, and
Bertozzi [14]. For the cost-effectiveness of prevention, see
Goldie et al. [15], Cohen, Shin-Yi, and Farley [9], Walker
[37], Hogan, Baltussen, Hayashi, Lauer, and Salomon [23],.
Fitzpatrick, Singer, Hotez, and Galvani [12] recommend a
Congressional cost-effectiveness committee to reveal
underinvestment in public health compared with other
sectors, and advance societal welfare and.
Section 2 provides the methods. Section 3 presents the
theoretical results. Section 4 presents the empirical re-
sults. Section 5 recommends and exemplifies a proced-
ure for estimating the model parameters. Section 6
discusses scope, limitations of the study, and future re-




N Number of persons
G Number of persons choosing safe behavior
L Number of persons choosing risky behavior while
not contracting the disease
Mj Number of persons not buying drug j, j = 1,2, with
or without drug production by pharmaceutical company
m1 Number of persons buying drug 1
m12 Number of persons buying both drugs 1 and 2
Cj Drug j purchasing cost for for person i, j = 1,2; i = 1,
…,N
cj Drug j production cost for the pharmaceutical com-
pany destined for person i, j = 1,2; i = 1,…,N
kj Exponential parameter scaling drug j production
cost, j = 1,2
dj Drug j development cost, j = 1,2
Ei Person i’s utility of risky behavior, i = 1,…,N
Hi Person i’s utility of safe behavior, Hi < Ei, i = 1,…,N
Ri Person i’s utility when recovering from disease, Ri <
Hi, i = 1,…,N
Di Person i’s utility of death, Di < Ri, i = 1,…,N
Strategic choices by person i, i = 1,…,N
Choice between risky behavior and safe behavior in
period 1
Choice whether to buy drug 1 or not buy drug 1 in
period 4
Choice whether to buy drug 2 or not buy drug 2 in
period 7
Strategic choices by pharmaceutical company
Choice whether to develop drug 1 at cost d1 in period 3
Choice whether to develop drug 2 at cost d2 in period 6
Strategic choices by donor
X1 Subsidy fraction of drug 1 development cost d1 in
period 3
S1 Subsidy fraction of drug 1 purchasing cost C1 for
person i in period 4
X2 Subsidy fraction of drug 2 development cost d2 in
period 6
S2 Subsidy fraction of drug 2 purchasing cost C2 for
person i in period 7
Strategic choices by Nature
q Disease contraction probability in period 2
x Disease recovery probability without drug 1 in
periods 4 and/or 5
r Virus mutation probability in period 5
w Disease recovery probability with drug 1 in period 6
v Disease recovery probability without drug 2 in
periods 7 and/or 8
s Disease recovery probability with drug 2 in period 8
Dependent variables
p Fraction of the N persons choosing risky behavior
Ui Person i’s expected utility, i = 1,…,N
u Pharmaceutical company’s expected profit
V Donor’s expected utility
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The model
We consider a population of N persons and the
complete information eight-period game in Fig. 1 with
four players and 13 choice (decision) nodes. The eight
periods have been designed to reflect the natural flow
of strategic choices by the players. The game naturally
starts in period 1 with person i choosing risky or safe
behavior. Also naturally, in period 2 Nature chooses
whether risky behavior causes disease contraction. In-
tuitively, with the presence of disease contraction, in
period 3 the pharmaceutical company needs to deter-
mine whether to develop drug 1. Consequently, if
drug 1 is developed, in period 4 person i and the
donor need to determine whether to buy and
subsidize drug 1. Given the presence of drug 1 in
some of the N persons, the natural next step, by Na-
ture in period 5, is whether the virus mutates. If the
virus mutates, again the pharmaceutical company
needs to make a strategic choice, in period 6, i.e.
whether to develop drug 2, since drug 1 is no longer
operational after the mutation. If drug 2 is developed
in period 6, that naturally has similar consequences
as after drug 1 was developed in period 3. That is, in
period 7 person i and the donor determine whether
to buy and subsidize drug 2. Finally, in period 8 Na-
ture chooses whether person i recovers or dies.
Fig. 1 Eight-period game for person i, the pharmaceutical company, the donor, and Nature
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Person i has three choice nodes. The two last of these
nodes are influenced by the donor (which may consist of
multiple donors considered as one collective unit) subsid-
izing the costs C1 and C2 of drugs 1 and 2 with a fraction
Sj for drug j, 0 ≤ Sj ≤ 1, j = 1,2, so that person i pays the
remaining fraction 1-Sj. The pharmaceutical company has
two choice nodes, influenced by the donor subsidizing the
costs d1 and d2 of the development of drugs 1 and 2 with
a fraction Xj for drug j, 0 ≤Xj ≤ 1, j = 1,2, so that the
pharmaceutical company pays the remaining fraction 1-Xj.
Nature has eight choice nodes and six strategic choices.
To ensure tractability all the N persons start the game at
the same time and proceed through the eight periods at
the same pace. Each person i prefers safe versus risky be-
havior differently, and assigns different utilities to
remaining healthy without or with excitement, to death,
and to recovery. The game may end after each period.
The game generally ends in different periods for each per-
son i depending on the different strategic choices.
Person i decides in period 1 whether to engage in
risky or safe behavior. Risky behavior gives positive
utility Ei if not contracting the disease. Safe behavior
gives positive utility Hi < Ei which means remaining
healthy. A fraction p and hence pN persons choose
risky behavior, where p follows from which of the N
persons choose risky behavior. Nature chooses in
period 2 that risky behavior causes disease contrac-
tion with probability q. Thus pqN persons contract
the disease. The pharmaceutical company chooses in
period 3 either to develop drug 1 at cost d1 subsi-
dized with a fraction X1, or to develop no drug at no
cost. With no drug, Nature chooses in period 4 re-
covery with probability x and positive utility Ri < Hi
for person i, or death with probability 1-x and nega-
tive utility Di < Ri for person i, and the game ends. If
drug 1 is developed, person i chooses in period 4 ei-
ther not to buy it (causing Nature to choose recovery
or death with the same probabilities x and 1-x as if
the drug were not developed), or to buy it at cost C1
subsidized by donors with a fraction S1. If drug 1 is
bought, in period 5 the virus is contained with prob-
ability 1-r (and Nature chooses recovery vs death in
period 6) or the virus mutates with probability r. In
the latter event the pharmaceutical company chooses
in period 6 either to develop drug 2 at cost d2 subsi-
dized with a fraction X2, or to develop no drug at no
cost. With no drug, Nature chooses in period 7 re-
covery or death and the game ends. If drug 2 is de-
veloped, person i chooses in period 7 either not to
buy it (causing Nature to choose recovery or death in
period 8), or to buy it at cost C2 subsidized by do-
nors with a fraction S2. If drug 2 is bought, in the
final period 8 Nature chooses recovery vs death with
probabilities s and 1-s respectively.
Summing up, person i has three strategic choice
variables. It chooses risky or safe behavior in period
1, chooses whether or not to buy drug 1 in period 4
(if the pharmaceutical company has developed it in
period 3), and chooses whether or not to buy drug 2
in period 7 (if the pharmaceutical company has devel-
oped it in period 6). The pharmaceutical company
has two strategic choice variables, i.e. whether or not
to develop drug 1 in period 3, and whether or not to
develop drug 2 in period 6. The donor has four stra-
tegic choice variables. It chooses the subsidy fraction
X1 to pay for drug 1 development in period 3, the
subsidy fraction S1 to pay for each person i’s drug 1
purchase in period 4, the subsidy fraction X2 to pay
for drug 2 development in period 6, and the subsidy
fraction S2 to pay for each person i’s drug 2 purchase
in period 7. Nature has six strategic choice variables
in eight choice nodes. It chooses the disease contrac-
tion probability q in period 2, the recovery probability
x in period 4 if drug 1 is not developed, the same re-
covery probability x in period 5 if drug 1 is developed
but not bought (and thus not applied), the virus mu-
tation probability r in period 5, the recovery probabil-
ity w in period 6 if drug 1 is bought (and applied)
and the virus is contained, the recovery probability v
in period 7 if drug 2 is not developed, the same re-
covery probability v in period 8 if drug 2 is developed
but not bought (and thus not applied), and the recov-
ery probability s in period 8 if drug 2 is bought (and
applied).
Individual persons’ behavior, benefits, and costs
Figure 1 has seven outcomes when not counting Na-
ture’s probabilistic choice of recovery or death. Counting
these seven outcomes from the root in the game tree
and outwards through the branches, and listing them
from condition 1 through condition 7, person i’s ex-
pected utility is
Ui ¼
Hi if safe behavior
Ei if risky behavior and no disease contraction
1−xð ÞDi þ xRi if risky behavior&disease contraction&no drug 1 development
1−xð ÞDi þ xRi if risky behavior&disease contraction&drug 1 development only
&not buy drug 1
1−rð Þ 1−wð ÞDi þ wRi½  þ r 1−vð ÞDi þ vRi½ − 1−S1ð ÞC1 if risky behavior&disease
contraction&drug 1 development only&buy drug 1 only
1−vð ÞDi þ vRi− 1−S1ð ÞC1 if risky behavior&disease contraction&drug 1
development&buy drug 1 &virus mutation&not buy drug 2
1−sð ÞDi þ sRi− 1−S1ð ÞC1− 1−S2ð ÞC2 if risky behavior&disease contraction&drug 1





Equation (1) contains four parameters Hi, Ei, Di, Ri
which differ for each person i, i = 1,…,N, two strategic
choice variables (which are parametric in the analysis) S1
and S2 chosen by the donor which are equivalent for the
N persons, five strategic choice variables (drawn by a
random generator) x,r,w,v,s chosen by Nature, and
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which also are equivalent for the N persons, and the N
persons’ drug purchasing costs C1 and C2. Nature’s stra-
tegic choice q of the disease contraction probability in
period 2 is implicitly present in (1) since it impacts
which of the seven conditions emerges. Which of the
seven conditions in (1) emerges depends on the pharma-
ceutical company’s two strategic choices of whether to
develop drug 1 in period 3 and develop drug 2 in period
6. Which of the seven conditions in (1) emerges also de-
pends on person i’s three strategic choices, i.e. whether
to choose risky or safe behavior in period 1, whether or
not to buy drug 1 in period 4 (if available), and whether
or not to buy drug 2 in period 7 (if available). Equation
(1) may be defined as a distribution function in the sense
that Nature’s five strategic choice variables x,r,w,v,s,
drawn by a random generator, causes distribution across
the outcomes if drawing from the random generator is
done repeatedly. All parameters are common knowledge
for all the players.
Condition 1 in (1) is valid for a risk averse person i
which assigns high utility Hi to safe behavior and low ex-
pected utility to the outcomes of risky behavior when
assessing the probabilities, drug production and costs.
Condition 2 is valid when Nature chooses no disease
contraction, that is q = 0, which gives utility Ei > Hi.
Conditions 3 and 4 in (1) are equivalent since if person i
does not buy drug 1, then it is irrelevant whether drug 1
is developed or not. Condition 5 states that person i
buys drug 1 at cost (1-S1)C1 after which the virus is con-
tained with probability 1-r and mutates with probability
r. Condition 6 states that the virus mutates which is a
precondition for drug 2 development, and that person i
does not buy drug 2. Outcome 6 appears twice in Fig. 1
since the pharmaceutical company may or may not de-
velop drug 2. The final condition 7 states that drug 2 is
developed and that person i buys it at cost (1-S2)C2.
Overall, with no drug development, only the first
three outcomes in (1) are possible. The third outcome
gives death with probability 1-x and recovery with
probability x. Hence all four utilities Hi,Ei,Di,Ri are
possible. If the pharmaceutical company develops
drug 1 but not drug 2, the first five outcomes are
possible. If the pharmaceutical company develops
both drugs 1 and 2, all the seven outcomes are pos-
sible. The N persons have different Hi,Ei,Di,Ri, and
thus distribute themselves across the three or five or
seven outcomes, depending on no drug development,
development of drug 1 but not drug 2, and develop-
ment of both drugs, respectively.
Pharmaceutical company’s behavior, benefits, and costs
The expected profit of the pharmaceutical company de-
pends on the numbers of persons buying drugs 1 and 2,
the drug prices, and the costs of drug development. We
assume that m1 persons buy drug 1 (and may or may
not buy drug 2) which allows outcomes 5–7, and that a
weakly smaller number m12, m12 ≤m1 persons buy both
drugs 1 and 2, which allows only outcome 7. This as-
sumption is in accordance with Fig. 1 where persons are
not allowed to enter the game in later periods. Hence
m1-m12 persons buy only drug 1 which allows outcome
5. Furthermore, assuming that person i has bought drug
1, in order to buy drug 2 the virus has to mutate, and
the pharmaceutical company must develop drug 2. The
pharmaceutical company’s expected profit is
u ¼
0 if no drug development
m1C1− m1c1ð Þk1− 1−X1ð Þd1 if only drug 1 development
m1C1 þm12C2− m1c1ð Þk1− m12c2ð Þk2− 1−X1ð Þd1− 1−X2ð Þd2





where kj scales the production cost for drug j, and cj is
the drug production cost for drug j, j = 1,2, for the
pharmaceutical company in the amount required for
person i, i = 1,…,N. Equation (2) contains two strategic
choice variables (which are parametric) X1 and X2
chosen by the donor, one strategic choice variable
(drawn by a random generator) r chosen by Nature, and
the nine parameters m1,c1,k1,d1,m12,k2,d2,C1,C2. Which
of the four conditions in (2) emerges depends on the
pharmaceutical company’s two strategic choices of
whether to develop drug 1 in period 3 and develop drug
2 in period 6, and depends on the strategic choices by
the N persons, the donor, and Nature.
When kj = 1, production cost is linear. When 0 < kj <
1, production cost is concave (economy of scale). When
kj > 1, production cost is convex (diseconomy of scale).
Condition 1 in (2) corresponds to m1 =m12 = 0 where
the N persons distribute themselves across outcomes 1–
3, condition 2 corresponds to m1 ≥ 0 =m12 where the N
persons distribute themselves across outcomes 1–5, and
condition 3 presumes virus mutation r = 1 and corre-
sponds to m1 > 0 and m12 ≥ 0 where the N persons dis-
tribute themselves across all seven outcomes.
Although person i has three choice nodes and the
pharmaceutical company has two choice nodes, four of
these five choice nodes are not reached if all N persons
choose safe behavior (outcome 1), or if those that choose
risky behavior do not contract the disease (outcome 2).
For the pharmaceutical company to develop drug 1 in its
first node, at least one person must contract the disease
and then that person can choose whether or not to buy
drug 1. For the pharmaceutical company to develop drug
2 in its second node, the virus must mutate and then
persons can choose whether or not to buy drug 2.
Table 1 lists the seven outcomes in the first row, and
the number of persons choosing each outcome in row 2,
where G is the number of persons choosing safe
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behavior and L (for lucky) is the number of persons
choosing risky behavior while not contracting the dis-
ease. We define Mj as the number of persons not buying
drug j despite drug j being produced by the pharmaceut-
ical company, j = 1,2. With these definitions, N-G-L-M1-
m1 is the unfortunate number of persons with outcome
3 contracting the disease while no drugs are available.
Row 3 lists person i’s strategy. Of interest to the
pharmaceutical company are row 4 showing the number
m1 of persons buying drug 1 and row 5 showing the
number m12 of persons buying both drugs 1 and 2. Drug
2 is developed only if the virus mutates. Row 6 shows
that the pharmaceutical company earns zero or negative
expected profit for outcomes 1–4, and may earn positive
expected profit for outcomes 5–7. The bottom row 7
shows the pharmaceutical company’s drug development
strategies.
In summary, the pharmaceutical company does not
develop drugs in outcomes 1–3, where expected profits
are zero. The pharmaceutical company does develop
drug 1 in outcomes 4 and 5, and subsequently develops
drug 2 in outcomes 6 and 7.
Donor’s behavior, benefits, and costs
We assume that the donor’s benefit is the sum of the
N persons’ benefits Hi,Ei,Di,Ri accounting for the
probabilities q,r,s,v,w,x, strategies, and numbers of
persons choosing the seven outcomes. The donor
subsidizes the development cost of drug j with Xjdj,
where Xj is the donor subsidy fraction, j = 1,2. The
donor subsidizes the drug purchasing cost of drug j
for person i with SjCj, where Sj is the donor subsidy
fraction, j = 1,2; i = 1,…,N. Since m1 persons purchase
drug 1, the donor subsidizes drug 1 with m1S1C1.
Since m12 persons purchase drug 2, the donor subsi-
dizes drug 2 with m2S2C2. The subsidy fractions Sj
and Xj are assumed to be parametric and thus the
strategic choices of the donor are not considered. For
the donor’s expected utility we get the same three
conditions as for the pharmaceutical company’s ex-
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XN−m12
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1−sð ÞDi þ sRi−S1C1−S2C2ð Þ −X1d1−X2d2





The first condition in (3) covers outcomes 1–3 with
no subsidies. The second condition covers outcomes 1–
5 with subsidies S1C1 and X1d1. The third condition
covers outcomes 1–7 with subsidies SjCj and Xjdj, j = 1,2.
Equation (3) contains four parameters Hi, Ei, Di, Ri
which differ for each person i, i = 1,…,N, four strategic
choice variables (which are parametric) S1,X1,S2,X2
chosen by the donor which are equivalent for the N per-
sons, five strategic choice variables (drawn by a random
generator) x,r,w,v,s chosen by Nature, and the nine pa-
rameters G,L,N,M1,m1,M2,m12,C1,C2. Which of the three
conditions in (3) emerges depends on whether no drug
is developed, only drug 1 is developed, and both drugs 1
and 2 are developed. Healthcare workers are not expli-
citly present in Fig. 1, but play a role by advising persons
on risky versus safe behavior and whether or not to buy
the drugs, and advising the pharmaceutical about the at-
tributes of the disease and other factors relevant for drug
development.
Theoretical results
We solve the game with backward induction starting
with period 8. Nature’s strategies are probabilistic
with the probabilities in Fig. 1. Hence we start with
period 7 where person i buys drug 2 if the benefits
from buying is at least as large as not buying it, that
is, if
Table 1 Outcomes, number of persons choosing the various strategies, and the pharmaceutical company’s drug development
strategies
Outcome 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Number of persons G L N-G-L-M1-m1 M1 m1-M2- m12 M2 m12
Person i Safe behavior Risky behavior Disease contraction Not buy drug 1 Buy drug 1 Not buy drug 2 Buy drug 2
m1 0 0 0 0 > 0 > 0 > 0
m12 0 0 0 0 0 0 > 0
Company’s expected profit 0 0 0 −(1 − X1)d1 Eq (2) Eq (2) Eq (2)
Company No drug development Drug 1 development Drug 2 development
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1−sð ÞDi þ sRi− 1−S1ð ÞC1− 1−S2ð ÞC2≥ 1−vð ÞDi þ vRi− 1−S1ð ÞC1
⇒ s−vð Þ Ri−Dið Þ≥ 1−S2ð ÞC2
ð4Þ
If (4) is not satisfied for m12 persons, the pharmaceut-
ical company does not develop drug 2. Otherwise in
period 6 the pharmaceutical company develops drug 2 if
the expected profit from developing drug 2 outweigh
those of not developing drug 2, that is, if
m1C1 þm12C2− m1c1ð Þk1− m12c2ð Þk2− 1−X1ð Þd1− 1−X2ð Þd2≥m1C1− m1c1ð Þk1− 1−X1ð Þd1
⇒m12C2− m12c2ð Þk2 ≥ 1−X2ð Þd2
ð5Þ
In period 4 person i buys drug 1 if the benefits of con-
suming drug 1 outweigh the benefits of not consuming
drug 1, that is, if
1−rð Þ 1−wð ÞDi þ wRið Þ þ r 1−vð ÞDi þ vRi½ − 1−S1ð ÞC1≥ 1−xð ÞDi þ xRi
⇒ w−xþ r v−wð Þð Þ Ri−Dið Þ≥ 1−S1ð ÞC1
ð6Þ
If (6) is not satisfied for m1 persons, the pharmaceut-
ical company does not develop drug 1. Otherwise in
period 3 the pharmaceutical company develops drug 1 if
it is profitable to do so, that is, if
m1C1− m1c1ð Þk1− 1−X1ð Þd1≥0⇒m1C1− m1c1ð Þk1 ≥ 1−X1ð Þd1
ð7Þ
In period 1 person i makes the following consider-
ations, given that it does not know whether the virus
mutates in period 5. If neither drug 1 nor drug 2 are op-
timal for it to buy, it chooses risky behavior if
1−qð ÞEi þ q 1−xð ÞDi þ xRið Þ≥Hi ð8Þ
If drug 1 is optimal for it to buy whereas drug 2 is not
optimal for it to buy, it chooses risky behavior if
1−qð ÞEi þ qð 1−rð Þ 1−wð ÞDi þ wRið Þ
þr 1−vð ÞDi þ vRi½ − 1−S1ð ÞC1Þ≥Hi
ð9Þ
If both drugs 1 and 2 are optimal for it to buy, it
chooses risky behavior if
1−qð ÞEi þ q 1−rð Þ 1−wð ÞDi þ wRið Þ þ r 1−sð ÞDi þ sRi− 1−S2ð ÞC2½ − 1−S1ð ÞC1ð Þ≥Hi
ð10Þ
With no disease contraction, inserting q = 0 into (8),
(9), or (10) gives
Ei≥Hi ð11Þ
which is satisfied by assumption guaranteeing risky be-
havior. Outcome 1 means that person i prefers safe
behavior, which occurs if neither (8) nor (9) nor (10) are
satisfied. Table 2 lists the seven outcomes O in the left
column, lists the equations that apply in the middle col-
umn, and lists the conditions in the right column.
Empirical results
Between 2000 and 2007, the median price for first-line
therapy in developing countries fell from $10,000 to
below $100 per patient per year, which approximately is
also the price today [30]. In 2017 the Clinton Health Ac-
cess Initiative [7] and partners announced an agreement
to produce a single HIV pill HIV to public sector pur-
chasers in low- and middle-income countries to around
$75 per person per year. Pillai et al. [33] find that the
mean yearly cost of pre-ART HIV care is $158.52.
Many “People Living With HIV/AIDS” require
second-line treatment due to resistance to first-line drug
treatment or not tolerating first-line drugs. The World
Health Organization [40] announces in 2007 that the
median price for the most frequently used first- and
second-line HAART (abacavir + didanosine + lopinavir/
ritonavir) treatment for low-income countries was
$1214. The World Health Organization [40] announces
that for 2008, in middle-income countries, the price for
second-line therapy was $3306 per year, as compared to
$91 for first-line therapy. Médecins Sans Frontières [30]
announces $87 as the cheapest first-line price and $749
(tenofovir + emtricitabine + lopinavir/ritonavir) as the
cheapest second-line price.
Companies such as GlaxoSmithKline, Merck, Bristol
Myers Squibb, offering ARV, adjust prices depending on
the countries’ socioeconomic status, applying their own
categorizations [30] or categorizations developed by the
World Bank [39]. Prices are also determined by acquisi-
tion processes and third party negotiation [7]. Also, as
expected, The World Health Organization [40] an-
nounces that large-scale production causes lower
process.
During 2017–2021 DiMasi et al. [11] estimate $2.6 bil-
lion in HIV drug R&D costs, and West and Schneider
[38] estimate $2.2 billion in revenues for South Africa,
Nigeria, Tanzania, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, and Egypt; $4.3 billion in revenues for the
Middle East and North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa;
and $6.1 billion in worldwide revenues.
Table 3 shows in row 1 the HIV resource availability
in US$ billion for low- and middle-income countries in
2018, and as percentages in row 2.
Estimating and exemplifying the model
parameters
Let us estimate the model’s parameters, including the
donor’s strategic choices X1,S1,X2,S2 and Nature’s stra-
tegic choices q,x,r,w,v,s, see the nomenclature in the
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beginning of the Methods section. The drug purchasing
cost Cj for drug j, j = 1,2, for person i, i = 1,…,N, is esti-
mated as Cj = $100 per year, which falls within
$75–$158.52 per year estimated in the previous section.
The drug production cost cj for drug j, j = 1,2, for the
pharmaceutical company destined for person i, i = 1,
…,N, is estimated as $80 per person per year, which is
20% below Cj = $100. The exponential parameter kj scal-
ing the drug production cost for drug j, j = 1,2, is esti-
mated as kj = 0.5, which assumes sufficiently large
markets and efficient production (since kj < 1, concave
production, economy of scale). (That contrasts with kj =
1 which would mean linear production and kj > 1 which
would mean convex production and diseconomy of
scale.) The drug development cost dj for drug j, j = 1,2, is
in the previous section estimated to be dj = $2.6 billion,
where we due to simplicity assume equivalent costs of
developing the two drugs.
Using Appelbaum’s [2] estimate $6.1–$9.1 million of the
value of statistical life, person i’s utility Di of death is esti-
mated as Di = −$7 million. (Such valuations typically de-
pend on how a person strikes a balance between health
risks and rewards, or on weighing wages against death risk
in the labor market.) Person i’s utility Ei of risky behavior,
i = 1,…,N, is estimated as 1/7 of the value of statistical life,
i.e. Ei = 1 million. Person i’s utility Hi of safe behavior, Hi <
Ei, i = 1,…,N, is estimated as Hi = 0.5Ei = $0.5 million. Per-
son i’s utility Ri when recovering from disease, Di < Ri <
Hi, i = 1,…,N, is estimated as Ri = 0.4Hi = $0.2 million.
The subsidy fraction Xj, j = 1,2, of drug development
cost d1 in period 3 and d2 in period 6 is estimated inter-
mediately as Xj = 0.5. (Since the pharmaceutical com-
pany is usually profit-seeking, the subsidy fraction Xj of
the drug development cost is usually below one.) Simi-
larly, the subsidy fraction Sj, j = 1,2, of drug purchasing
cost C1 for person i in period 4 and C2 for person i in
period 7 is estimated intermediately as Sj = 0.5. (Coun-
tries with extensive social welfare programs may choose
a higher subsidy fraction Sj.) The estimates of Xj and Sj
may be assessed further in view of the percentages in
Table 3.
The disease contraction probability q in period 2 is es-
timated as q = 0.1, influenced by HIV/AIDS data from
UNAIDS [36] which show the HIV prevalence fractions
among adults aged 15–49. Although these prevalence
fractions range from < 0.1 for many countries to 0.273
Table 2 The seven outcomes O, the equations that apply, and an example (section 5, i.e. the section labelled "Estimating and
exemplifying the model parameters"). Yes and No in the rightmost column specify whether each example inequality matches
whether the inequality in the corresponding equation should be satisfied
O Description Equations Conditions
1 Person i prefers safe behavior Neither (8) nor (9) nor (10) are satisfied. (8),272,000 < 500,000 Yes
(9),559,995 > 500,000 No
(10),847,993 > 500,000 No
2 No disease contraction, causing risky behavior (8) or (9) or (10) is satisfied. (8),272,000 < 500,000 No
(9),559,995 > 500,000 Yes
(10),847,993 > 500,000 Yes
3 Contracting disease and no drug development (4),(5),(6),(7) are not satisfied, and (8) is satisfied (4),5.76 × 106 > 50 No
(5),1.4 × 109 > 1.3 × 109 No
(6),2.88 × 106 > 50 No
(7),2.0 × 109 > 1.3 × 109 No
(8),272,000 < 500,000 No
4 Contracting disease, drug development, but not
buying drug 1
(4),(5),(6) are not satisfied, (7) and (8) are satisfied (4),5.76 × 106 > 50 No
(5),1.4 × 109 > 1.3 × 109 No
(6),2.88 × 106 > 50 No
(7),2.0 × 109 > 1.3 × 109 Yes
(8),272,000 < 500,000 No
5 Contracting disease, buying drug 1, virus is
contained, and no development of drug 2
(4) and (5) are not satisfied, (6),(7),(9) are satisfied (4),5.76 × 106 > 50 No
(5),1.4 × 109 > 1.3 × 109 No
(6),2.88 × 106 > 50 Yes
(7),2.0 × 109 > 1.3 × 109 Yes
(9),559,995 > 500,000 Yes
6 Contracting disease, buying drug 1, virus mutation,
and not buying drug 2 (which may or may not be
developed)
(4) is not satisfied, (5),(6),(7),(9) are satisfied (4),5.76 × 106 > 50 No
(5),1.4 × 109 > 1.3 × 109 Yes
(6),2.88 × 106 > 50 Yes
(7),2.0 × 109 > 1.3 × 109 Yes
(9),559,995 > 500,000 Yes
7 Contracting disease and buying drugs 1 and 2 (4),(5),(6),(7),(10) are satisfied (4),5.76 × 106 > 50 Yes
(5),1.4 × 109 > 1.3 × 109 Yes
(6),2.88 × 106 > 50 Yes
(7),2.0 × 109 > 1.3 × 109 Yes
(10),847,993 > 500,000 Yes
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for Eswatini, q is usually higher than the prevalence. In
fact, frequent risky behavior in interaction with persons
who have contracted the disease, or in environments
with high HIV prevalence, may cause q to be close to
one, though with very low HIV prevalence it can be
much lower. The disease recovery probability x without
drug 1 in periods 4 and/or 5 is estimated as x = 0.1. It
can be expected to be low, and close to or equal to zero
for serious or deadly diseases. The virus mutation prob-
ability r in period 5 is estimated as r = 0.5. The disease
recovery probability w with drug 1 in period 6 if the
virus is contained is estimated as w = 0.9, thus assuming
that drug 1 is useful. The disease recovery probability v
without drug 2 in periods 7 and/or 8 is estimated as v =
0.1, assuming that refraining from using drug 2 is risky.
The disease recovery probability s in period 8 if drug 2
is bought (and applied) is estimated as s = 0.9, thus as-
suming that drug 2 is useful.
The inequalities in the rightmost column in Table 2
follow from assuming the parameter values above, as-
suming that m1 = 20 million persons buy drug 1, and
that m12 = 14 million persons buy drug 2. Outcome 1
does not follow since (9) and (10) are satisfied, while (8)
is not satisfied, which induces risky behavior. If person
i’s utility Hi = $0.5 million of safe behavior increases
above Hi = $0.847993 million, then (10) is not satisfied,
and person i chooses safe behavior instead. If person i
chooses risky behavior, with subsequent disease contrac-
tion, outcomes 1 and 2 are impossible, and outcomes 3,
4,5,6 or 7 arise instead. Outcome 2 with risky behavior is
possible (with probability 1-q) since (8) or (9) or (10) is
satisfied, and arises with probability 1-q chosen by Na-
ture of no disease contraction. Outcome 3 does not fol-
low since (4),(5),(6),(7) are satisfied, while (8) is not
satisfied, and hence the pharmaceutical company pro-
ceeds to develop drug 1. The pharmaceutical company
develops drug 1 if at least m1 = 14 million persons buy
drug 1. Since m1 = 20 million, drug 1 is developed. Out-
come 4 does not follow since (4),(5),(6),(7) are satisfied,
while (8) is not satisfied. Hence the pharmaceutical com-
pany proceeds to develop drug 1, person i buys it, and
the donor subsidizes it. Outcome 5 with death (probabil-
ity 1-w) or recovery (probability w) is possible since (4),
(5), (6), (7), (9) are satisfied, and arises with probability
1-r chosen by Nature of virus containment. Outcome 6
with death (probability 1-v) or recovery (probability v) is
possible since (4), (5), (6), (7), (9) are satisfied, and arises
with probability r chosen by Nature of virus mutation.
Outcome 6 is possible if the pharmaceutical company
does not develop drug 2, or the pharmaceutical company
develops drug 2 but person i does not buy it. The
pharmaceutical company develops drug 2 if at least
m12 = 14 million persons buy drug 2, which is satisfied.
Outcome 7 is the only row in Table 2 which specifies
Yes to all the inequalities. That is, (4), (5), (6), (7), 10)
are satisfied. Outcome 7 means that person i chooses
risky behavior, contracts the disease, and buys both
drugs 1 and 2, which means that the pharmaceutical
company develops both drugs. Outcome 7 assumes that
Nature chooses disease contraction with probability q
and virus mutation with probability r. Outcome 7 means
that person i dies with probability 1-s or recovers with
probability s. Inserting the parameter values into (1),
person i’s expected utility is
Ui ¼
$0:5 106 if safe behavior
$106 if risky behavior and no disease contraction
−$6:28 106 if risky behavior&disease contraction&no drug 1 development
−$6:28 106 if risky behavior&disease contraction&drug 1 development only
&not buy drug 1
−$3:40 106 if risky behavior&disease contraction&drug 1 development only
&buy drug 1 only
−$6:28 106 if risky behavior&disease contraction&drug 1 development
&buy drug 1 &virus mutation&not buy drug 2
−$5:20 105 if risky behavior&disease contraction&drug 1 development





In (12) person i prefers outcome 2 (line 2) if the dis-
ease is not contracted. If the disease is contracted after
risky behavior, person i prefers outcome 5 if the virus is
contained (line 5), or outcome 7 (line 7) if the virus mu-
tates which gives the highest expected utility − 5.2 × 105.
Weighing outcome 2 and either outcome 5 or outcome
7 against each other with the given probabilities chosen
by Nature, person i chooses risky behavior rather than
safe behavior. Consequently, with these parameter
values, the availability of both drugs induces risky behav-
ior. Inserting the parameter values into (2), the pharma-
ceutical company’s expected profit is
u ¼
0 if no drug development
$7:00 108 if only drug 1 development





Hence the pharmaceutical company prefers to develop
drug 1 if the virus is contained, develop both drugs if
the virus mutates. The donor’s expected utility requires
specifying the five additional parameters N,G,L,M1,M2.
The number N of persons is assumed to be N = 100
Table 3 Total HIV resource availability in US$ billion for low- and middle-income countries in 2018, and as percentages of the sum
Year Domestic (Public and Private) Global Fund United States (bilateral) Other international Sum
2018 10,659.15 1600.24 5139.08 1620.89 19,019.36
2018% 56.04 8.41 27.02 8.52 100.00
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million, which is the population one studies, e.g. a coun-
try in the data provided by UNAIDS UNAIDS [36], or
chosen from a statistics database. The number G of per-
sons choosing safe behavior is estimated to be G = 40
million. The number must evidently be less than N, and
may be corroborated e.g. by purchases of protections
against sexually transmitted diseases (e.g. condoms), or
by other indicators of safe behavior. The number L of
persons choosing risky behavior while not contracting
the disease is estimated to be L = 30 million. It must evi-
dently be less than N-G = 70 million. The number of m1
of persons buying drug 1 was estimated above to be
m1 = 20 million. It must evidently be less than N-G-L =
30 million, since person i will not buy drug 1 without
disease contraction. The number M1 of persons not buy-
ing drug 1 despite drug production by the pharmaceut-
ical company is estimated to be M1 = 7 million. It must
evidently be less than N-G-L-m1 = 10 million. The num-
ber of m12 of persons buying drug 2 was estimated above
to be m12 = 14 million. It must evidently be less than N-
G-L = 30 million, since person i will not buy drug 2
without disease contraction. The number M2 of persons
not buying drug 2 despite drug production by the
pharmaceutical company is estimated to be M2 = 4 mil-
lion. It must evidently be less than N-G-L-m12 = 16 mil-
lion. The above estimates implies that N-G-L-M1-m1 = 3
million persons contract the disease without drugs being
available, since the pharmaceutical company does not
develop drugs. We assume that all persons are equiva-
lent to person i. Inserting these parameter values into
(3), the donor’s expected utility is
V ¼
−$1:384 1014 and M1 ¼ m1 ¼ 0 if no drug development
−$8:080 1013 and M2 ¼ m12 ¼ 0 if only drug 1 development





Equation (14) implies that the donor prefers the devel-
opment of both drugs if the virus mutates, which gives
the highest expected utility, and prefers that drug 1 is
developed if the virus is contained. The lowest expected
utility in line 1 in (14), with no drug development, fol-
lows from the third sum in (3) which sums the negative
expected utility (1 − x)Di + xRi for person i over N-G-L
persons, instead of summing over N-M1-m1-G-L per-
sons as in line 2. The fourth sum in line 2 in (3) also
sums the negative expected utility (1 − x)Di + xRi for per-
son i, over M1 persons who do not buy drug 1. In con-
trast, the fifth sum in line 3 in (3) sums the expected
utility ((1 − r)[(1 − w)Di +wRi] + r[(1 − v)Di + vRi] − S1C1)
for person i, which is higher than (1 − x)Di + xRi since
r = 0.5 and 0.1 = v = x ≤w = 0.9, over m1 persons who
buy drug 1. When m1 is sufficiently high, that causes
line 2 in (14) to be higher than line 1. That all three lines
in (14) are negative may be common for a donor. It may
be due to factors not accounted for in this article, e.g.
non-monetary rewards (e.g. a reputation for being altru-
istic), charitable contributions, or aid from governments
or public or private enterprises which may seek eco-
nomic welfare which may follow when the labor force is
more healthy.
Discussion
This section discusses the scope and implications of the
study, highlights the limitations, and considers future re-
search. The model’s scope involves strategic interaction
between N persons choosing risky versus safe behavior,
a pharmaceutical company choosing whether or not to
develop one or two drugs depending on virus mutation,
a donor assumed to be parametric, and Nature. The
seven outcomes are that person i chooses safe behavior,
chooses risky behavior without disease contraction, con-
tracts the disease without drug 1 availability, contracts
the disease with drug 1 availability but without buying
drug 1, contracts the disease with drug 1 availability and
buying drug 1, not buying drug 2, and buying drug 2.
The parameter estimation in the previous section 5 illus-
trates the realization of the seven outcomes. We chose
to illustrate outcome 7 which captures movement
through the entire eight-period game in Fig. 1, while also
illustrating why outcomes 1–6 do not arise with these
parameter values.
As science, society, technology, and economic condi-
tions change, the parameter values may change, which
may cause any of the seven outcomes to emerge. For ex-
ample, drugs may become cheaper or more efficient, vi-
ruses may mutate in unknown ways, pharmaceutical
companies may become more efficient, donors may
subsidize more or less, Nature may choose the probabil-
ities differently, and persons may change balances they
strike between risky and safe behavior. Insight into such
changes may enable the players themselves, and non-
modeled players such as healthcare workers, hospitals,
governments, and international organizations to choose
better strategies.
Various limitations exist for this study. First, as a use-
ful first step we confine attention to N persons, one
pharmaceutical company, one donor, and Nature, which
means that we do not model other players in the health
system, such as healthcare workers, hospitals, govern-
ments, regulators, politicians, and international organiza-
tions. Second, although the N persons differ in their
utilities Ei of risky behavior, Hi of safe behavior, Ri when
recovering from disease, and Di of death, i = 1,…,N, we
do not formalize the probability distributions for these
utilities, which may change over time. Third, we con-
sider one pharmaceutical company, which abstracts away
competition between multiple pharmaceutical compan-
ies and market conditions which may impact prices,
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drug quality, etc. Fourth, we consider one parametric
donor instead of multiple donors as strategic players po-
tentially competing or facing a collective action problem.
Fifth, we assume that Nature chooses disease contrac-
tion, recovery, mutation and death, some of which may
be impacted by strategic choices made by non-modeled
players.
Some of these limitations can be addressed in various
ways in future research. First, research may classify dif-
ferent kinds of people according to age, sex, occupation,
ethnicity, race, etc., and model probability distributions
of various preferences and beliefs including risky versus
safe behavior and how they recover from disease. Sec-
ond, research may model more than one pharmaceutical
company with different economic and scientific capabil-
ities, preferences, and beliefs; may enable strategic
choices by multiple donors, may incorporate more
choices by Nature, and may model more players. Third,
research may model different kinds of recovery from dis-
ease, depending on people’s different characteristics,
economic capabilities, geographical location, etc. Fourth,
research may model how disease contraction, recovery,
and death impact and are impacted by drug production,
drug quality, drug availability and costs, geographical
distribution of drugs, and countries’ GDP, debt, product-
ivity, income earnings, economic growth, societal condi-
tions, and cultural preferences. Fifth, future research
may model multiple donors as strategic players compet-
ing to donate in multifarious ways, may endogenize Na-
ture’s parametric choices which may be extended
beyond those considered in this article, e.g. by consider-
ing proliferation of virus mutation potentially spreading
out of control. Sixth, the disease contraction probability
with and without one or several drugs may be assumed
to depend on multiple gradations and classifications of
each person’s risky and safe behavior, the characteristics
of persons, each person’s earlier medical history includ-
ing exposure to infectious diseases, the number of per-
sons having previously contracted the disease, and
different kinds of matching of infected and non-infected
persons. Seventh, various kinds of vaccinations prior to
potential disease contraction may be incorporated into
an analysis in combination with or matched against vari-
ous kinds of drugs designed to ensure recovery after dis-
ease contraction. Eighth, the disease recovery probability
may be endogenized by modeling the biological process
by which viruses evolve [31, 34]. Ninth, research may
model how people choose various kinds of behaviors, in-
cluding potential vaccination if available, at different
stages of drug development, i.e. at early stages where
drugs may have uncertain quality and side effects, versus
mature stages where the quality may have been im-
proved and side effects ameliorated or removed. Tenth,
research may incorporate different expectations by the
players about future disease development, virus muta-
tion, and drug availability. Eleventh, research may model
how people may contract the disease at different points
in time, and how the various players may make strategic
choices at different points in time. Twelfth, research
may tailor models to the specifics of various diseases.
Thirteenth, future research should compile empirical
data on a variety of infectious diseases including HIV/
AIDS and Covid-19 to test the model in this article and
future models that may be developed.
Conclusion
An eight-period game is developed between N persons
and a pharmaceutical company. Each person chooses ei-
ther risky or safe behavior. Risky behavior may lead to
disease, e.g. HIV/AIDS or Covid-19. The pharmaceutical
company develops one or two drugs under various con-
ditions. Drug 1 is developed if it is profitable, i.e. if suffi-
ciently many persons contract the disease and choose to
buy drug 1. Drug 2 is developed if the virus mutates,
and if sufficiently many persons who have contracted
the disease choose to buy drug 2. The donor chooses
parametrically whether to subsidize the pharmaceutical
company’s development of drug 1 and/or drug 2, and
whether to subsidize each person’s purchases of drug 1
and/or drug 2. The donor’s choices thus impact both the
pharmaceutical company’s choices and each person’s
choices. This illustrates the game theoretic nature of the
phenomenon. Nature chooses probabilistically whether a
person with risky behavior contracts the disease,
whether the person recovers without drug 1, whether
the virus mutates, whether the person recovers with
drug 1, whether the person recovers without drug 2, and
whether the person recovers with drug 2.
Each person’s expected utility depends on seven out-
comes, i.e. safe behavior, risky behavior without disease
contraction, risky behavior with disease contraction and
no drug 1 availability, drug 1 availability without buying
drug 1, buying drug 1, virus mutation and not buying
drug 2, and virus mutation and buying drug 2. The
pharmaceutical company’s expected profit depends on
three outcomes, i.e. no drug development (outcomes 1–
3 for the persons), only drug 1 development (outcomes
4–5 for the persons), and virus mutation and drug 1 and
drug 2 development (outcomes 6–7 for the persons).
The donor’s expected utility also depends on these three
outcomes.
Backward induction is applied to solve the game de-
pending on conditions for the seven outcomes. The par-
ameter values are estimated and exemplified in a
procedure which applies HIV/AIDS data for prevalence,
deaths, HIV expenditure, treatment costs, R&D costs
and revenues, and HIV resource availability, for various
countries. The model constitutes a tool or mechanism to
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comprehend a person’s choices between safe and risky
behavior, whether to purchase one or several drugs,
whether a pharmaceutical company should develop one
or several drugs, whether a donor should subsidize drug
development and drug purchases, accounting for how
Nature chooses disease contraction, recovery, virus mu-
tation, and death, with and without drugs.
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